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Within philosophy, there are various forms of reduction and, therefore, of reductionism. Phenomenalists claimed that sentences about physical objects could be translated without loss of meaning into sentences about actual or possible experiences. Sentences about physical objects were analysed into sentences about actual or possible experiences. Physical object concepts were said to be dispensable. So phenomenalists were analytical or conceptual reductionists. Analytical or conceptual reductionists analyse one set of statements or concepts in terms of another.
Metaphysical reduction involves the reduction of one part of reality; one part of reality is said to be nothing over and above another part of reality. So, for example, idealists (see idealism) argue that the physical part of reality is nothing over and above the mental part of reality. They need not consider that our talk about physical objects can be analysed in terms of talk abut actual or possible experiences. They need not be phenomenalists. Metaphysical reductionists do not require analytical or conceptual reduction. But they do attempt to reduce the physical part of reality to the mental part of reality.
Nomological reduction involves the reduction of one set of laws of Nature to another. For example, the laws of thermodynamics can be reduced to in the sense of derived from the laws of statistical mechanics. AJ
See also phenomenalism.Further reading J. Foster, A.J. Ayer; , E. Nagel, The Structure of Science. |
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