| |
Phenomenalism (Greek, ‘theory of what appears’, ‘theory of what is’), in philosophy, is the doctrine that statements about physical objects have the same meaning as certain statements about actual or possible sensory experiences. So, for example, the statement that there is a chair in the room might be held to have the same meaning as the statement that if someone is in the room, then he or she will have a visual experience as of a chair. It was in this spirit that J. S. Mill defined material objects as ‘permanent possibilities of sensations’.
There are two reasons to doubt that statements about physical objects have the same meaning as certain statements about actual or possible sensory experiences. Consider the suggestion that the statement that there is a chair in the room means the same as the statement that if someone is in the room, then he or she will have a visual experience as of a chair. The second statement is not only about actual or possible sensory experiences, but still contains reference to physical entities to the room. Further, it could be true that there is a chair in the room without its being true that if someone is in the room, then he or she will have a visual experience as of a chair. For the chair will only cause someone to have a visual experience of it if there is enough light to see it and the person\'s nervous system is working. So the statement about sensory experience which is said to mean the same as the physical object statement must be revised, to refer to yet more physical conditions and objects: in this case to light and to nervous systems. So statements about physical objects do not have the same meaning as statements which refer only to actual or possible sensory experiences, and not to any physical objects. AJ
See also idealism.Further reading A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic; , J. Foster, , A.J. Ayer. |
|
