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I can remember that Mrs Thatcher resigned from the post of British Prime Minister in 1991. This is a case, in philosophy, of propositional knowledge, of knowing a proposition about the past. I can also remember seeing Mrs Thatcher holding back her tears as her car swept out of Downing Street. This is not a case of propositional knowledge, but a case of personal memory, of remembering an event from my own past experience. Propositional knowledge of the past is not limited by the extent of one\'s own past experience, whereas personal memory is. I can remember that World War II ended in 1945, but I have no personal memory of the end of World War II, because I was not yet born and therefore not around to experience the event.
In order to have personal memory of a past event one must have experienced the event. One must also currently have a mental representation of the event. But this is not enough for personal memory. Suppose that I have forgotten all about my fifth birthday party, but when asked to imagine what happened at my fifth birthday party, I imagine throwing a tantrum while wearing a blue suit. Further suppose that, as a matter of complete coincidence, I did throw a tantrum while wearing a blue suit at my fifth birthday party. Then I currently have an accurate mental representation of a past event which I did experience at the time. But I am not currently remembering my party it is just that, as a matter of complete coincidence, my imaginings are accurate.
Such considerations have led philosophers to claim that in order to have personal memory of a past event, it is not enough to have a mental representation of a past event which one experienced. It must also be the case that one\'s past experience of the event is causally relevant to one currently having a mental representation as of it. AJ
See also causal theories.Further reading S. Davis, Causal Theories of Mind; , N. Malcolm, Memory and Mind. |
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