| |
Foundationalists hold that there is a category of beliefs which justify all other beliefs which count as knowledge, but which do not themselves require justification in order to count as knowledge. All beliefs that count as knowledge are either part of this foundation, or are built upon and justified by it. These foundational beliefs may concern subjects\' own experiences. So, beliefs about one\'s own experiences will not require justification in order to count as knowledge, but beliefs about anything other than one\'s own experiences—beliefs about supposedly more theoretical matters, such as beliefs about the laws of Nature—will require justification by beliefs about one\'s own experiences in order to count as knowledge. The beliefs that form the foundation of all other knowledge need not be certain, but they can only be undermined by reference to beliefs of the same class. That is, beliefs about one\'s own experiences do not need to be certain in order to count as knowledge, but they can only be undermined by other beliefs about one\'s own experiences.
Coherentists deny that there is any such class of foundational beliefs. The belief that a certain experience occurred can be overturned by beliefs about supposedly more theoretical matters. For example, the belief that a certain experience occurred can be overturned by a sufficiently well-justified belief that such an experience would violate a law of Nature. So it is not the case that while beliefs about laws of Nature are justified or undermined by beliefs abut one\'s own experience, beliefs abut one\'s own experience cannot be undermined by beliefs about laws of Nature. All beliefs hang together, and beliefs abut experiences and supposedly more theoretical matters such as the laws of Nature are mutually adjusted. Beliefs must be adjusted all together, in a single, coherent, holistic web. It is not the case that one sub-set of beliefs justifies all others, but cannot be overturned by those other beliefs. AJ
See also epistemology; knowledge.Further reading Bonjour, The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge; J. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge. |
|
