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Double Aspect Theory |
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This is the theory, in philosophy, that while mental and physical aspects or properties are radically different, they are nevertheless aspects or properties of the same things. Mental and physical properties are distinct, and neither can be reduced to the other. They are fundamentally different from each other, and neither should be regarded as more real than the other. But they are nevertheless aspects of the same things. Those who infer from the radically different nature of mental and physical properties to the claim that minds are non-physical, having no physical properties, and that bodies are non-mental, having no mental properties, are mistaken. AJ
See also dualism; mind-body problem.Further reading T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere; , P. F. Strawson, Individuals. |
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